C.K. Greenwood v. Societe Francis De, 111 F.3d 1239 (5th Cir. 1997) (Decided April 28, 1997) by Edward Stueck, Class of 1999
Admiralty Practicum 
Volume 1997 
Issue 1 Winter 1997 Article 10 
February 2018 
C.K. Greenwood v. Societe Francis De, 111 F.3d 1239 (5th Cir. 
1997) (Decided April 28, 1997) 
Edward Stueck, Class of 1999 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward Stueck, Class of 1999 (1997) "C.K. Greenwood v. Societe Francis De, 111 F.3d 1239 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(Decided April 28, 1997)," Admiralty Practicum: Vol. 1997 : Iss. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum/vol1997/iss1/10 
This Recent Admiralty Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Admiralty Practicum by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
Craddock for PMSA's lost cargo. The Coun of Appeals held "each assured would have liability 
coverage for the loss of another's cargo, including another insured, but would not· have coverage 
for the loss of its own cargo." 
The Court of Appeals also had to decide what amount of damages Craddock was enntled 
to receive from Wilson, who had negligently canceled his P&I policy. Under the canceled policy 
Craddock was entitled to receive $250 per package, or in case of goods not shipped in packages. 
per customary freight unit. The district court found the fish meal processing plant was not shtpped 
in packages, which was not disputed upon appeal. Therefore, the computation of damages 
centered upon the parties' meaning of customary freight unit. 'Customary freight untt' ts a term 
of art found in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) §§ 1 et seq., 1 (c), 46 USC:\ §§ 
1300 et seq., 1301 (c). In General Motors Corp. v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 451 F :d :�. :5 
(2d Cir. 1971 ), the court held that the customary freight unit represents not the shippmg umt. but 
the unit of cargo "customarily used as the basis for the calculation of the freight rate to be 
charged." Thus, the court herein held that in order to ascertain the meaning of the customary 
freight unit in the shipping contract, it must look to the intentions of the parties as ev1denced m 
the bills of lading, applicable tariffs, and the freight rates charged. 
Wilson argued that the freight rate that Craddock charged PMSA was based upon the 
transportation of the entire plant as one unit under a flat rate. Therefore, the plant ttself was the 
customary freight unit. Craddock and PMSA argued that the freight rate was based upon �% of 
the plant's value, therefore, making the customary freight unit the U.S. dollar. The court exammed 
the bills of lading under which the plant was shipped and noted each bill listed vanous pans of 
the plant. However, the bills consistently stated a lump sum freight charge and were not computed 
on a percentage of the value of the plant shipped. As a result, the court held that the ennre plant 
was the customary freight unit and that Wilson's liability to Craddock was limited to S250 for the 
entire $1.7 million dollar plant. 
William J. Foley, Class of 1999 
VESSEL OWNERS, STEVEDORES A�D LONGSHOREMEN MUST BEWARE OF 
DEFECTS SURROI:::'IIDING THE WORK ZONE 
When a vessel owner provides equipment for use by longshoremen, obvious ddrcts must 
be reported and be of sufficient cause to cease operations. Otherwise, continurd usr by 
longshoremen will result in release of vessel owner liability for the existing ddects. 
CK. Greenwood. v. Societe Francis De. Ill F.3d 1239 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(Decided April 28, 1997) 
On April 1, 1986, Societe Francaise De and Indian Ocean Boat Carriers, defendants and 
shipowners of the MN PENA VAL, turned their vessel over to a stevedore whose responsibility 
it was to employ longshoremen to unload the vessel. The operation of unloading the vessel. which 
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occurred over a three day period, was carried out with no input from the ship's crew. On the first 
day of unloading, a crane operated by one of the longshoremen, malfunctioned due to an obvious 
problem with the crane's slewing brake. The malfunction in the crane resulted in its moving too 
far in a horizontal direction, causing one of the cargo hooks to strike a longshoreman in the face. 
�o report of this injury was made to the vessel owner and the longshoremen continued to use the 
crane. Later in the day the same crane developed a problem with the boom brake, which controls 
vertical movement. Once this problem was discovered, the crew shut down the crane for repairs. 
After the repairs were made, the crew used the crane throughout the duration of the unloading 
process. Soon after, this action was brought by the longshoreman to recover damages from the 
vessel owner. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas entered judgment for 
the longshoreman. On appeal, however, the decision was reversed. The Court of Appeals 
considered the issue of when it should become obvious to a shipowner that a stevedore's judg­
ment, based on its specialized knowledge, is obviously improvident or dangerous. The court 
considered the fact that even though the shipowner knew of the defect, it was also obvious to the 
stevedore, who allowed the crane to be used, as well as to the longshoremen. 
The court herein applied §5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 
which states, ''the primary responsibility for the safety of the longshoremen rests upon the 
stevedore." However, vessel owner liability may still arise in three instances: 
1) if the vessel owner fails to warn on turning over the ship of hidden defects of which he 
should have known. 
2) for injury caused by hazards under the control of the ship. 
3) if the vessel owner fails to intervene in the stevedore's operations when he has actual 
knowledge both of the hazard and that the stev�dore, in the exercise of 'obviously improvident' 
judgement, intends to continue working despite the hazard and therefore cannot be relied on to 
remedy it. 
Regardless of the above, however, if the defect is open and obvious to the longshoreman, 
then there is no breach of duty on the vessel owner's behalf. However, if the longshoremen's 
only alternative proved to be impracticable or time-consuming then the vessel owner can still be 
held liable. In this instance, any necessary repairs to the crane only required the longshoremen 
to shut it down, during which time they would still have received compensation. This alternative 
was not deemed to be impracticable by the Court of Appeals. Therefore, because the stevedore 
failed to show that the shipowner had both actual knowledge of the existing defect and that the 
stevedore intended to continue using the item with the defect, which if left unremedied posed a 
substantial risk of harm, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision and found in 
favor of the vessel owner. 
Edward Stueck, Class of 1999 
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